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Suhail Malik
What does an artwork mean for you? What sense do you make of it? In the paradigm 
of contemporary art the answer is clear: it’s up to you. Constrained by the artwork’s 
subject matter (insofar as you can determine it), its material organization and pre-
sentation (including online transience), and the information you can glean from 
the press release, the artist’s “interests,” or what the art invokes, you respond to this 
configuration of mild injunctions. “Mild” because the parameters are open enough, 
loose enough, opaque enough for you to (have to) make your own way through the 
artwork. It asks you a question, making an open- ended assertion without definitive 
sense. You reply—usually not to the artwork but, in the best case, with a shift in your 
own system of ideas, values, even the very way you formulate your languages. You 
are the center of the artwork. Or, as Juliane Rebentisch accurately remarks, since the 
artwork is not just its material being but also the sense that it makes and the values 
it inscribes, what is primary in contemporary art—its condition and horizon—is the 
art experience that is the transformation of both the subjective viewer and the artwork:
 
Aesthetic experience is nothing that can be “had” by the subject. The term 
“experience” refers to a process between subject and object that transforms 
both—the object insofar as it is only in and through the dynamic of its 
experience that it is brought to life as a work of art, and the subject insofar 
as it takes on a self- reflective form, its own performativity.1
What Rebentisch captures and affirms very well here is that under the name “aesthetic 
experience” contemporary art depends upon its receiving subject, the addressee of 
the work, who is taken to constitute it rather than arrive as latecomer after its pro-
duction. Put colloquially, the art “leaves space” for the viewer, the viewer “com-
pletes” the work. Contemporary art is the art that forefronts aesthetic experience 
in this sense. Historically, it corresponds to the work made from the late 1950s by 
Allan Kaprow and others against the strictures of high modernism (crucial to which 
was the retrospective affirmation of Marcel Duchamp’s readymades), gaining trac-
tion through the 1960s in other modes, notably with the combined, if sometimes 
 A version of this essay appears in Spike 37 (Fall 2013).
1 Juliane Rebentisch, “Answers to Questionnaire on the Contemporary," October 130 (Fall 2009): 101. 
See also, in English, “7 Negations: Against Aesthetics Affirmationism,” in Aesthetics and 
Contemporary Art, ed. Armen Avanessian and Luke Skrebowski (Berlin: Sternberg Press, 2011), 
51–64; and The Aesthetics of Installation Art, trans. Daniel Hendrickson and Gerrit Jackson (Berlin: 
Sternberg Press, 2012).
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mutually acrimonious, developments of Conceptual art and Minimalism as well as 
early performance art, and attaining total spectrum dominance in the metropolitan 
centers of the West since the mid-1980s and globally since the mid- late 1990s. The 
centrality of aesthetic experience as the condition and horizon of art was abetted 
by theoretical insights in deprioritizing authorial claims over meaning and privi-
leging instead interpretation and reception as the key moment of meaning making 
(Umberto Eco, Roland Barthes, and, retrospectively, Mikhail Bakhtin were the key 
early figures in this regard).
That a reality such as art can only be apprehended by the thinking or 
consciousness of it such that it is necessarily accompanied by that thinking and 
consciousness is the dependency or injunction that Quentin Meillassoux has influ-
entially called correlationism.2 The problem with correlationism is that all accounts 
of reality are necessarily accounts of how reality is thought or known. Put the other 
way, reality itself cannot be known “in itself ” since it is always thought or appre-
hended by a consciousness. Thought never takes leave from itself, if only because 
it thinks that departure and what is outside of it: what you know is always what 
you know. The many difficult self- reflexive philosophical problems that follow in 
establishing the possibility of a knowledge of the real for what it is independent 
of thought—that is, realism—will be left aside here, as will a detailed account of 
the various recent philosophies, gathered under the umbrella term Speculative 
Realism (SR), which strive to break out of correlationism. What is more immediately 
pressing here is that, in having a subject of aesthetic experience as its condition, 
contemporary art is a correlationism. 
To be clear: contemporary art as the aesthetic experience of sense- and 
value- making, as the co- constitution of the art object and subject, assumes correla-
tionism and reproduces it, affirms it, in every moment of its open- ended experi-
ence. The artworks and the discursive formulation of contemporary art—objects, 
events, performances, images, press releases, reviews, magazine essays, auction 
catalogues—stylize and configure a correlationism in how art is to be taken by its 
audience. Contemporary art appeals to its addressees to determine the art in their 
own terms, including the disagreement between viewers that is the best ideal “dem-
ocratic” result. Artists have an “interest” in this or that; the artwork or exhibition 
“explores,” “plays with,” “interrogates,” or “shows a sensitivity about” such and 
such topic. No more definitive or precise an account can be permitted at the cost 
of reducing viewers’ own capacities to make their call on the art. Abstractions serve 
this expectation and prioritization of experience well. And, for all their considerable 
differences, experience is the key category in theories central to contemporary art: 
it sits on both sides of Michael Fried’s split between absorption and theatricality; 
it is the condition of Jacques Rancière’s “aesthetic regime of art,” whose political 
2 See Quentin Meillassoux, After Finitude: An Essay on the Necessity of Contingency, trans. Ray Brassier 
(London: Continuum, 2008); and also Meillassoux, “Time without Becoming,” trans. Robin 
Mackay, Spike 35 (Spring 2013).
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effects are the reorganization of experience; it is the term of the intractable that 
can only be felt or sensed through its materiality (Jean- François Lyotard), or of the 
singularities of affect that can be mobilized but not perceived or conceptualized 
(Gilles Deleuze), or events that escape the consistency and logic of identification 
in an inaesthetics (Alain Badiou). In their common flight from communicable 
thought and concept—sometimes formulated as an anti- aesthetics—each of these 
philosophies repeats the insistence that the artwork remain bound to a field of (per-
haps unthinkable) subjective experience that it cannot reflect upon or rationalize 
without distorting itself irrecuperably. An emphasis on materiality in art carries the 
same desire of a primacy of sensory and spatiotemporal experience: matter is held 
to be extraneous, uncontrolled, excessive, or processual, but in any case against or 
to the side of form/concept/thought/intention; unctuous, residual matter or emer-
gent material organization escapes the control or command of the artist’s imposed 
parameters on the artwork. How else to apprehend the chromatic bounciness of the 
print, the light- sucking bleakness of the sculpture, the gloopy resilience of the paint 
in relation to the figures presented in such material presentation? Supposing sensory 
and finite experience as a condition and term of art, the artwork has an inarticu-
lable or excessive presence in front of which there can only be an articulation—a 
linguistic aftereffect—that necessarily misses or misapprehends it. That presence is 
of a material order other to language’s semantic and transferrable dimension. While 
Rosalind Krauss and Yve- Alain Bois proposed an art- historical mobilization of this 
insistent meaninglessness under the Bataillean name of the informe,3 the insistence 
on/of matter as art’s snaring of experience persists today even through digital pro-
duction with the emphasis on glitches, noise, disruptions, and slickness, all of which 
draw attention to what is produced and made manifest by the means of production 
“itself ” as much as by its manipulation by artists as human agents.
For all the anti- conceptuality and experiential primacy of these approaches, 
and the paradoxical anti- philosophy of contemporary art as a post- conceptual 
practice,4 they are in every case correlationist. As such, they are to be rejected by 
any rigorous realism. (Such a realism, which claims to apprehend the real outside 
of thought or the conditions of subjective experience, is not to be confused with 
realism as a style or genre of art committed to “accurate” representations of preex-
isting reality, since such a genre already assumes representation as an interval from 
a real elsewhere.) Aesthetically determined and organized, contemporary art has 
nothing to offer non- correlational realism. Put the other way, a rigorous realism 
3 See Rosalind Krauss and Yve- Alain Bois, Formless: A User’s Guide (New York: Zone Books, 1997).
4 For Peter Osborne contemporary art is “post- Conceptual” in that, consciously or not, art now 
presumes the critical legacy of Conceptual art as a condition, including an indifference to medium- 
specificity as granting certain ontological privileges. See Peter Osborne, Anywhere or Not at All 
(London: Verso, 2013). Osborne claims that contemporary art is not “an aesthetic art in any 
phil osophically significant sense of the term” but rather only in its difference from the literality of the 
everyday (p. 10). For Osborne, contemporary art is then an art without aesthetics. The present essay 
argues, to the contrary, that contemporary art is the exemplar of the aesthetic constitution of art.
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can readily dispense with art as it now stands without loss or limitation. From yet 
another angle, realism’s provocation to art is the undoing of aesthetic experience 
as a condition or term of art, even in the avowal of art’s ineluctable materiality. 
Which is to say that realism speculatively indicates the conditions for another art 
than contemporary art. 
But it is important in this regard to proceed with some caution in the dimension 
of realism. For, as Documenta 13 amply demonstrated, mobilizing object- oriented 
variants of SR within contemporary art is a trivial if not conservative undertaking: 
the relation of objects amongst themselves, in which the human supposedly has no 
particular privilege, fits very well with a formalist, perhaps proto- modernist notion of 
art that privileges its objects and their composition—internal and mutual—over the 
external eye and ear of an observing, knowing subject but that nonetheless calls upon 
a distributed notion of subjectivity in which the human participates on a supposedly 
equal footing. The artist or viewer can appear as a mediator in this relation but is 
not necessary to it. Other versions of this logic include immersive art, networked art, 
systems art, and so on. While the emphasis in object- oriented approaches on the 
(non)relations between all objects themselves “equally” challenges the primacy of 
the human subject as a prerequisite for their mutual (in)comprehension, an equality 
between the art object and the human maker or addressee fits very well with any 
number of clichés just exposed on the primacy, obduracy, or excess of matter and 
object to human control. While revoking the primacy of interpretation it is nonethe-
less a generalized variant of the co- constitution of object and (sometimes) human 
subject that is the aesthetic experience of contemporary art.5 
Contrast this to the variant of SR whose apparently paradoxical claim is that 
the real or absolute is apprehended without anthropomorphic, anthropocentric, or 
noocentric distortion only by rational thought. The primary model here is science 
(for Meillassoux, in the restricted form of mathematically organized science; for Ray 
Brassier, in the general form of the explanatory power of the naturalistic technosci-
ences; for François Laruelle, as the intertwining of thought and the real, without a 
decision in favor of the former); and the demand upon contemporary art is strictly 
nontrivial: it removes subjective interpretation or experience as a condition or telos 
of the artwork, and therewith collapses the entire edifice of the contemporary art 
paradigm. While this need not be a direct concern for contemporary art, since 
rationalist SR need have no bearing on art (and should in fact rightly disregard or 
dismiss contemporary art as a lost cause), such a rationalism puts firmly destruc-
tive pressure on the current operating, artistic, intellectual, and ideological para-
digm of art, pressure that is much needed as contemporary art now all- too- happily 
continues to recycle standard tropes of anti- foundationalist critique, ethical piety, 
apolitical politicality, and cultural hegemonization. While contemporary art can 
5 Graham Harman stresses aesthetics as “first philosophy” in “On Vicarious Causation,” Collapse 2 
(March 2007): 187–221. Harman also formulates this point in The Quadruple Object (Alresford: Zero 
Books, 2011) as the resurrection of a “pan- psychism” of objects.
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be dismissed by a rationalist SR without consequence for the latter, bringing it to 
bear on art nonetheless forces a series of demands and criteria for art in terms other 
than those of contemporary art. The speculation it invites is what an art other than 
contemporary art could be, not as a capricious flight of imagination or a frustrated 
wish but by being rationally known. 
We can begin that speculation at once: the critique of correlationism made by 
rationalist SR is not the generalization of aesthetic experience but, to the contrary, 
a demonstration that there can be a knowledge of what has never been experienced 
(for Meillassoux, such is the arche- fossil or the God arriving tomorrow; for Brassier, 
the death of the sun; for Iain Hamilton Grant, the natural, nonhuman concept). An 
art responsive to this theoretically- led imperative would be indifferent to the experi-
ence of it, an art that does not presume or return to aesthetics, however minimal or 
fecund such an aesthetics might be. The condition and horizon of such an art is not 
that it be felt, appreciated in vague ways, or made- sense- of as contemporary art is, 
affirming in each case the viewer in her or his sensitivities and capacity for judgment. 
Indifferent to aesthetic experience, it is an art of rational knowledge. “Knowledge” 
here means that if there is an experience to be had, it can not only be formulated 
with a coherent logic and reasoned (even if its results are historically irrational), 
but also that it is subject to the predictive and generative exercise of reason qua new 
organizations of matter, thought, and experience. 
There are precursors to such an art. Example: the reduction of aesthetics 
and the indifference to fabrication or reception was instantiated at the moment of 
moving from modern art to contemporary art with “instruction pieces,” in which 
artists gave (usually typewritten) instructions for the fabrication of their work by 
anonymous gallery workers. Such work has been described as an “aesthetics of 
administration,”6 the instructions taking the form of managerial or bureaucratic 
edicts, and have themselves been more recently subject to commodification and 
aestheticization as they come to be traded as archived art- objects in their own right. 
However, they also epitomize contemporary art’s conventions insofar as the art 
is taken to be “completed” not only with its construction as per the instructions, 
but—as advocated by several Fluxus artists—completed by its addressee. Yet this 
aestheticization of the instruction is not its operational logic, but the refusal of the 
same. What such instructions suppose in their open reproducibility as instruction, 
as much as in the art object whose construction or presentation it spells out, is 
(i) the indifference of such art to any subject or meaning imposed upon it other 
than the fact of its systemic fabrication, and (ii) that the artwork qua instruction 
is indifferent to its own material conditions (it does not matter to this art if the 
paper is lined or not, if the typeface is Courier or Times New Roman, even if the 
object is fabricated or not, if anyone reads them or not, and so forth). As Robert 
Morris’s Statement of Aesthetic Withdrawal from 1963 makes clear in declaring its 
6 Benjamin Buchloh, “Conceptual Art 1962–1969: From the Aesthetic of Administration to the 
Critique of Institutions,” October 55 (Winter 1990): 105–43.
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own material redundancy as well as that of the work that is its ostensible referent, 
in stating the condition for the art that it itself is qua instruction piece,7 such art 
is conceptually- systemically organized, immaterially determined, subjectively 
indifferent, aesthetically redundant, rationally cogent. It need not be experienced. 
Taking both of its dimensions together, instruction art acts as a paradigm for all 
post- Conceptual art in that it lends itself to (always temporary, partial) “comple-
tion” in subjective experience yet, against this, it also need not be experienced at 
all, but only known, in order to be art. This is conventionally a criticism of art, in 
fear of art abdicating its singularity for systematicity. The series of reductive banal-
ities that Benjamin Buchloh attributes to Sol LeWitt as critic of high modernism 
typify such a reaction: 
[LeWitt’s] work now revealed that the modernist compulsion for empiri-
cist self- reflexiveness not only originated in the scientific positivism which 
is the founding logic of capitalism (undergirding its industrial forms of 
production just as much as its science and theory), but that, for an artistic 
practice that internalized this positivism by insisting on a purely empiri-
cist approach to vision, there would be a final destiny. This destiny would 
be to aspire to the condition of tautology.8 
7 Morris: “The undersigned, ROBERT MORRIS, being the maker of the metal construction entitled 
LITANIES, described in the annexed Exhibit A, hereby withdraws from said construction all 
aesthetic quality and content and declares that from the date hereof said construction has no such 
quality and content. Dated: November 15, 1963 [signed] Robert Morris.” While the Statement is  
taken art- historically to be a negating rejoinder to Philip Johnson’s non- payment for Litanies (the piece 
that is the statement’s immediate referent), theories supportive of contemporary art take it to be 
either an instance of the broader negating of material- optical specificity and objectality in favor of 
engagement with institutional and linguistic structures that is now a standard operation for 
contemporary art (Buchloh, Ibid., 117–18), or, concomitant to such a determination and no less 
typical as a contemporary art procedure, as an “ironic” overdetermination of the artwork that  
is its direct referent, exposing the Duchampian readymade as the common condition for both the 
statement and the artwork itself (Martha Buskirk, The Contingent Object of Contemporary Art 
[Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 2005]). In contradistinction to these aesthetically expansive accounts, 
the Statement is here taken more emphatically to be a description of its own conditions as an artwork. 
That is, Morris’s Statement is at once performative and constative of itself, yet, in relation to Buchloh’s 
complaint against the scientistic “positivism” of conceptual art’s empiricism quoted later in the  
main text here, it is not tautological in that it is heterogeneously performative, constituting its own 
terms of operation as art by virtue of its rational and didactic exemption of the “art” of Litanies from 
its material external referent. This “de- aestheticization” was well- captured by Harold Rosenberg in 
1970, though he identifies that “movement” or tendency with a return to “primitivism” in its rejection 
of artifice. See “De- Aestheticization,” in Alexander Alberro and Blake Stimson, eds., Conceptual Art: 
A Critical Anthology (Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 1999), 220–22. Rosenberg was not without cause in 
this characterization, given the limitations of the art of the time and its broad identification of 
Conceptualism with anti- formalism understood as anti- idealism and hence as pro- materialist. What 
is advocated here is, rather, the rationalism of the Statement, whereby its art takes place in its 
presentation, here or elsewhere, strictly equivalent to its presentation on the document signed by 
Morris in person; that is, it is art by virtue of its literal rather than material synthesis.
8 Buchloh, “Conceptual Art,” 115.
